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Abstract 
This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of 
agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm 
subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization 
were designed to promote a disperse ownership and give managers a high level of 
discretion in running the company. By this, the government effectively created an 
agency problem inside the firm. There were no powerful shareholders to constrain 
the managers, and the threat of a takeover was  not  a credible one, since the 
government kept a golden share.  There is no overall evidence of capture of 
politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although 
evidence suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. 
We interpret the political interference with the firm’s control (a well documented 
phenomenon both in this study and in the cross-country literature on privatization; 
e.g. political ends in privatization, influence in appointments, golden shares) as 
the most visible part of such collusion. Liberalization and multi-level regulation 
will likely make any type of collusion or capture more difficult in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
  Studies of agency problems in regulation and of agency problems inside the firm have 
progressed in parallel in recent years. However, there is not much research on the interaction 
between both agency problems.
1 This study provides a step in this direction, investigating the 
case of a large privatized firm still subject to many policy constraints. 
The former public sector telecommunications monopolist in Spain, Telefonica, 
became a fully privatized firm in early 1997. Its shares were then owned by more than one of 
eight Spanish households (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999). It had become one of 
the clearest examples of “popular capitalism.” Since December 1998 it also faced a widely 
liberalized market. However, the company also operates under a more complex regulatory 
system: its operations are constrained by decisions taken by a number of institutions: 
governments (in the different countries where the firm now operates), regulatory agencies, 
courts and supra-national authorities. The picture of a monolithic firm and a single-agent 
regulator is too simplistic to properly analyze the interaction between agents in the firm and 
agents in the political arena. 
The company responded to the challenge of competitive product and capital markets 
by undertaking a strategy of diversification and corporate change. Telefonica became one of 
the European companies with the highest direct investment in Latin America and a global 
operator in what has been called the New Economy. Its behavior illustrates the changes that 
the telecommunications sector faces as it adapts to deregulation, convergence and 
globalization.
2 This paper analyzes this strategy and quantifies its impact on shareholder 
value. The agency theory of the firm and also the capture theory in regulation, based on the 
seminal work by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), are used to analyze and interpret the 
facts. Previous studies have analyzed either one or the other,
3 but not the interaction of both 
theories. The main hypothesis tested here is that some agents in government (the politicians) 
collude with some agents in the firm (the managers), at the expense of voters and 
shareholders. We interpret the well documented political interference in the firm in terms of 
such collusion. 
  Regulatory changes determine to some extent the internal structure of firms. Kole and 
Lehn (1997) make specific predictions about the changes in corporate behaviour that should 
be expected after deregulation. Their main point is that deregulated companies should adopt 
structures that make them more similar to other large firms that compete in open capital and 
product markets. However, many privatized companies still face regulation in some segments 
(most notably, the regulation of access or other constraints on prices). Also, many of these 
firms are still subject to important policy-makers’ decisions, not only through product market 
regulation, but also through corporate control restrictions, such as golden shares.
4 
                                                 
1 An exception is the 2002 special issue of Telecommunications Policy on “Corporate Control and Industry 
Structure in Global Communications”. Among the articles published there, the following ones shed light to the 
issue of the relationship between regulation and the firm’s behaviour and organization: Waverman and Trillas 
(2002), Trillas (2002), Lehn (2002), Megginson, Bortolotti, D’Souza and Fantini (2002). See also Trillas (2000) 
for a similar approach on the electricity industry. 
2 Koski and Majumdar (2002) and Bulent et al. (2001) also study the performance of telecommunications 
incumbents in this context. 
3 A related event study testing the capture theory of regulation is Dnes and Seaton (1999). They find no overall 
evidence of capture of OFTEL by BT in the UK. 
4 Within this context, Wallsten (2001) has shown that privatization without attention to regulation may be costly 
to consumers, and privatization combined with a separate regulator yields better results. Moreover, Wallsten 
(2002a) also shows that sequencing matters: countries that create separate regulators before privatizing perform 
better.  
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  To illustrate the issue with the case of Telefonica just before its full privatization and 
until 2000, the paper focuses on two sets of events.
5 The analysis of the impact of policy 
decisions is designed to test for several variations of the capture theory of regulation, and 
managerial decisions are analyzed to test hypotheses related to the agency theory of the firm. 
Among the latter, many of the decisions in this period had to do with mergers and 
acquisitions. Some conclusions are derived from stock returns. Although markets may 
anticipate the broad expansion strategy of the firm, the announcement of the implementation 
of this strategy by management releases new information. The same can be said about 
regulation and public policy: although markets can anticipate the broad aspects of policy, 
announcements by relevant agents release new information. According to the financial 
markets efficiency hypothesis, the stock price provides the best estimate for the change in 
market value of the company as a result of unanticipated announcements.  
The results presented in this paper show that Telefonica certainly introduced 
significant  changes following privatization and deregulation, most notably diversification, 
although the previous management had already engaged in investments in Latin America. 
Although there are scale and scope economies that  may  justify consolidation in the 
telecommunications sector, this does not imply that every deal is a value creating one. Agency 
problems in acquiring firms may be the reason for expansion projects that do not create value 
for the shareholders, either because the price is too high or because synergies fail to 
materialize. The quantitative results show that investors welcomed the announcement of 
international alliances and mergers (even when they eventually did not take place) but not 
always  those of  direct investment in Latin America and other acquisitions. Some of the 
acquisitions in the media industry had a positive impact on shareholder value, but not all of 
them. Overall, there is no evidence of capture of politicians by shareholders, in the sense that 
facts and data do not show a pattern of policy decisions having a positive impact on 
shareholder value. There is some evidence of collusion between managers and politicians. 
This is made possible by agency problems in politics (voters are unable to fully control 
politicians) and by agency problems inside the firm (shareholders are unable to fully control 
managers). 
  The content of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the history of 
Telefonica and the theory behind the several issues that are taken up in the empirical analysis. 
Section 3 presents the methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 shows the evidence and 
Section 5 presents concluding comments. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Path to privatization and telecommunications reform 
  Telefonica, the former telecommunications public monopoly in Spain, was totally 
transferred to the private sector in 1997, after the State sold its last stake in the company. This 
ended a long period of public ownership of the telecom company.  
However, the company had also been privately owned in the past.
6 Telephone service 
was introduced in Spain in the early eighties of the 19th. century. After a few years (1884-86) 
of public ownership of the first lines being put in service, in 1886 the government legally 
established that the telephone service was to be operated mainly by private firms. The service 
was extended by many small firms and local concessions. Because of lack of coordination and 
underinvestment,  the need emerged for service unification.
7 
                                                 
5 Other policies of the new management team that are of interest in this period, but beyond the scope of this 
paper, are restructuring measures that have to do with the labour force, and marketing efforts as a reaction to 
competition such as discount plans or expenditure in publicity. 
6 Wallsten (2002b) argues that, in many European countries, privatization is a return to the private sector. 
7 See Calvo (1998) for a detailed history of telecom business in Spain.  
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  In 1924 the Compañía Telefonica Nacional de España (Telefonica henceforth) was set 
up as a private firm with national as well as foreign shareholders. Among the latter, the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Co. (ITT) held the largest stake. Telefonica was 
granted the monopoly through an arrangement with the Spanish Government. Between 1924 
and 1944 telephone service in Spain was provided by a privately owned monopoly. 
  After the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and during the late years of the II World War, 
Franco's Regime nationalized many network companies operating in Spain at that time. 
Telefonica was one of them. In December 1944, the government began negotiating with ITT 
in order to transfer ITT's shares to national ownership. After buying 80 percent of ITT’s 
shares in 1945 the State became the largest shareholder in Telefonica, although the state’s 
stake in the total capital of the company was not above 50 percent (the remainder being 
owned by ITT, banks and as many as 250,000 small investors). However, Telefonica was a 
publicly controlled monopoly, in the sense that the government appointed those in charge of 
strategic and day to day decisions. 
   In the  mid eighties, the Socialist government (in office since 1982)  started a 
privatization program.
8 Within this framework, in 1987 the government sold a small stake of 
6 percent of Telefonica through a Public Offering (PO) in the Stock Market.
9 Revenues from 
the PO amounted to 283.7 million Euros, and it reduced the state's stake from 38 percent to 32 
percent. However, day to day operation, including Chairman’s appointment, continued under 
government control. The sale of this stake was neither intended to relinquish public control of 
the company nor mainly oriented to raise money because of fiscal pressures. Instead, the 
objective was to float Telefonica on the New York Stock Exchange; as a matter of fact, there 
was only an international tranche. The objectives pursued by the socialist government in 
doing so were (1) to get foreign partnership to stimulate supervision on company management 
under public control, thus increasing  efficiency, and (2) to increase the possibilities of 
financing Telefonica's expansion investments without affecting the Budget. This was 
consistent with other POs of large State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), such as Endesa 
(electricity) and Repsol (gas) in the late eighties.  
In the mid nineties the Maastrich Treaty fiscal criteria to qualify for joining the 
European Monetary Union put strong pressure on the Spanish government finances. Within 
this context, in Autumn 1995 there was a PO to sell another stake (11 percent) of Telefonica. 
Revenues from the PO amounted to 1,000.2 million Euros and it further reduced the state's 
stake from 32 percent to 21 percent. As it happened after the PO in 1987, day to day operation 
continued under government control.  
In March 1996 the conservative Popular Party won the national election promising to 
privatize all the public sector. In Telefonica, a new Chairman -Juan Villalonga- was appointed 
by the government in June 1996. Telefonica’s privatization was completed subsequently. 
Villalonga, 43 years old at the time, had no previous experience in the Telecoms industry. He 
came from the investment bank sector. He had held executive positions in the consultancy 
McKinsey, in CS First Boston and in Bankers Trust. This financial background fits the move 
of the company towards  setting as the first priority  the creation of shareholder value. In 
addition to this experience, the new Chairman had worked with experts and politicians in or 
close to the incumbent Popular Party in the design of the privatization strategy of the new 
government. 
                                                 
8 Privatization was total for many small and medium size state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, in the case 
of large size network SOEs, the socialist government did not totally privatize and relinquish control. See Bel 
(2002). 
9 This very gradual privatization (full divestiture would not be completed until 1997) makes it very difficult to 
use “before and after” comparisons.   
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  The 21 percent stake that the state still retained in the company was sold through a PO 
in January-February 1997. Revenues from PO amounted to 3,885.5 million Euros. After this 
last PO, the company was totally privately owned, and the government had relinquished day 
to day control, although a temporary (10 years) 'golden share' was kept to preserve 
government influence on some strategic decisions. 
 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
After complete privatization, Telefonica's shareholder dispersion increased. This is a 
consequence of the technical design of the 1995 and 1997 POs. Both of them included 
discounts on the final price for small investors (4 percent for general investors and 8 percent 
for employees). Also, both POs included fidelity bonuses for small investors: that is, the 
promise of getting 1 free share for every 20 shares bought, provided that the investor did not 
sell the shares during one year after the PO. Rationing was needed in both POs, since small 
investors demand was largely higher than  the offer directed to them. The ratio demand/offer 
was 7.3 in 1995 and 7.2 in 1997. 
  Besides the enlargement of the  number of  shareholders, a 'hard core' of financial 
investors existed since the mid nineties, although it lost practical importance progressively. 
Three financial institutions (two banks and one savings bank) held stakes of around 5 percent 
of total capital: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Argentaria and La Caixa.  
 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Table 2 shows that the behavior of Telefonica in the stock markets was remarkable: 
shares prices increased by almost 300 percent during the period under study (1996-2000). 




(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Figure 1 extends the analysis to 2003, comparing the firm to an international stock index and 
to other telecom incumbents. It is apparent that the company has performed well as far as 
stock prices are concerned. This is a relevant piece of evidence, since as a fully privatized 




It is conventional wisdom that at the moment of privatization the industrial framework 
in which the privatized company is to operate should be as clear as possible. In Spain, it was 
decided to privatize Telefonica as a vertically integrated firm. In 1996, the government 
announced its new telecommunications policy. As far as regulation is concerned, there were 
no formal price caps in the period of interest, and rates were annually decided by the 
government on an ad hoc basis.  
A separate regulatory agency was first created in 1996, the Commission of the 
Telecommunications Market (CMT in Spanish), which would act as the anti-trust authority in 
the sector. The government, under pressure from the European Union, decided to liberalize 
entry in telecommunications starting in 1998, after a short-lived duopoly policy in mobile 
telephony. The second firm in mobile telephony was Airtel. Soon after liberalization a second 
                                                 
10 Soon after his appointment as Chairman of Telefonica, Juan Villalonga stated that one of his priorities would 
be to ''increase the value of the company for all investors in the new framework of the sector'' (El Pais, 8/6/96).  
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firm entered fixed telephony. This was Retevision, a partially publicly owned company that 
started to compete with Telefonica (later on Retevision was fully privatized), and formerly 
operating in the transmission of TV signals. Neither  Airtel's nor  Retevision's shares were 
traded in the stock market in their first years of operation.  
As a result of its expansion abroad, most notably in Latin America, the company was 
also increasingly exposed to regulatory risk in other countries. As opposed to the experience 
of the United Kingdom (analyzed by Spiller and Vogelsang, 1997, and Dnes and Seaton, 
1999) privatization did not take place in a context of stable regulation and industry structure. 
The newly privatized company had to immediately adapt to a rapidly changing environment. 
In 2000, at the end of the period investigated below in the event study, Telefonica was 
the first Spanish firm in profits, income and equity value. It had 50 million clients in 11 
countries. 
   
2.2. Hypotheses  
  This subsection presents the hypotheses and related literature for the issues analyzed 
in the quantitative study. 
   
i) The Firm 
  a) First hypothesis: Since privatization has political and economic ends, there will be 
political interference with the company’s control. Privatization  per se may not change 
incentives, although it offers an opportunity to change the corporate governance of the firm.
11  
Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) and Bel (2003) empirically show that share issue 
privatizations have both political and economic objectives,
12 and that many governments keep 
some form of control after selling the assets (such as golden shares or partial privatization). 
This may create corporate governance problems, since the ownership structure of the 
company is not necessarily the one that maximizes shareholder value. Trillas (2000) argues 
that political objectives, in the form of collusion between managers and privatizing 
governments, yield higher levels of shareholder dispersion than the ones that would obtain if 
privatization maximized financial proceeds. The reason for this is that managers “lobby” the 
privatizing government for a higher than optimal dispersion, in order to benefit from larger 
control rents.  
b) Second hypothesis: After privatization managers will undertake expansion projects 
beyond those that  are  positive  net present value (Free cash-flow theory).  
Telecommunications firms after privatization and on the eve of deregulation are potential 
candidates for the application of Jensen’s (1986) free cash-flow theory: the firms identified by 
Jensen for his theory face declining revenues in the core business and may have flawed 
corporate governance mechanisms. This gives incentives to managers with deep pockets to 
undertake  expansion  projects beyond those that are  positive  net  present value. When 
managers perform poorly, they may diversify to try to improve performance and save their 
jobs. If industry conditions are changing, they may well want to diversify their human capital, 
irrespective of the most efficient strategy to undertake from the investors’ point of view.
13 
Telefonica’s management had at its disposal a large free cash flow, since the company 
was still enjoying important incumbency advantages. This was certainly the case after it was 
                                                 
11 According to Dewenter and Malatesta (1998), private firms are more profitable than public sector ones, but 
privatization per se does not increase profitability, as proved by the good results obtained on average for their 
international sample of firms 3 years before privatization. Cragg and Dyck (1998), in their study on managerial 
turnover in British privatized firms, reach the conclusion that the effect of privatization on incentives was more 
pronounced after four years in the private sector and in sectors not subjected to price regulation. 
12 Empirical studies on political objectives in privatization rely basically on hypotheses established in Perotti and 
Guney (1993), Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002). 
13 Robison et al. (1995) confirm the existence of agency problems in the diversification activities of utilities.  
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decided that the firm would not distribute dividends, as had been traditional for decades in the 
company.
14 However, Jensen mentions another condition for the free cash flow theory to 
hold: firms must face low growth prospects in the core business. It is arguable whether the 
core business of Telefonica was telephony in Spain or telecommunications services in 
general. It can be argued as well that the potential for growth in telecommunications has 
varied over time in the recent years, and it was arguably high for most of the period analyzed 
in the quantitative study below (1996-2000). Then, whether Telefonica and similar firms fall 
under the set of firms that fulfil the conditions for the application of the free cash flow theory 
is an empirical issue.  
There are also arguments that can be used to justify that some degree of expansion 
was value-enhancing. Scale and scope economies due to technological change, and the 
enlargement of the market due to both technology and privatization in other countries 
(especially in Latin America), made some acquisitions potentially profitable. One of the main 
reasons for diversification from the demand side is that developing countries may need the 
presence of foreign operators to benefit from some know-how necessary to develop new 
technologies. Noll (2000) argues that the typical privatization choice in developing countries 
is selling controlling stakes of telecommunications incumbents to operators in developed 
countries, or at least to consortia that include a major telecoms operator. Besides, since giving 
cash back to shareholders may draw the attention of politically motivated regulators, internal 
capital markets may provide a way to avoid the expropriation of the firms' returns. In contexts 
that allow a rate of return above the cost of capital, diversification may provide an efficient 
investment opportunity.
15 A utility may prefer productive diversification rather than capital 
markets to spread its risk, due to costs of transacting in capital markets and due to tax 
advantages of conglomerates (reinvesting within the firm can avoid the tax payments that 
accompany dividends).
16 Conversely, failure in some other field can endanger a utility's credit 
and earnings. Whether the agency or the synergy reasons prevail is an empirical matter, and 
the conclusion depends on the value of each acquisition for the firm, the price paid for it, the 
regulatory reaction and other time and country-specific characteristics. The exercise below 
contributes to clarify which events increased shareholders’ wealth and which ones did not for 
a particular firm and in a particular time-period. 
c) Third hypothesis: Deregulation induces a better alignment between managers and 
shareholders interests. Research on the interaction between regulation and the relationship 
between managers and shareholders concludes that more information from the regulatory 
agency has the effect of subsidizing the monitoring actions of managers by shareholders. On 
the one hand, this creates scope for more dispersed shareholding and/or causes less need for 
performance related compensation to managers.
17 On the other hand, since regulated 
executives have less influence on outcomes, different skills are needed, and labor markets for 
regulated and unregulated firms are different. According to this view, the typical utility CEO 
would be like a bureaucrat: in regulated firms ''public relations'' and ''political'' skills are more 
valued due to the need for the company to play the regulatory game. According to Kole and 
Lehn (1997: 424) and Lehn (2002) deregulation would in part remove these constraints and 
                                                 
14 Hyman and West (1989) argue that deregulation induces lower dividend payout. 
15 Investment in related sectors may trigger the reaction of regulators or anti-trust authorities, which is not the 
case for investments in multi-utilities or foreign investment. 
16 From a social welfare maximizing point of view, the potential efficiency gains from diversification must be 
balanced against the loss from more difficult regulation due to blurred cost estimates (most notably, the equity 
cost of capital), cross-subsidization incentives and difficulties in implementing yardstick competition. Efficiency 
gains may then not be easily passed on to consumers.  
17 Joskow et al. (1993) argue that intervention in the compensation process by well-informed and influential 
outsiders may affect the contracts between shareholders and top executives. Moreover, utilities operate in an 
environment where low risk derives into lower compensation.   
  7 
would make regulated managers resemble more their colleagues in non-regulated firms. They 
argue that deregulation increases the importance of the managerial function in the firm: 
''Deregulation provides a unique opportunity to observe the Darwinian process at work. It 
serves as a shock that requires firms to adapt their strategies and organizational structures to 
the new rules of the game.'' An enlarged room of manoeuvre for managers should lead to cost-
cutting operational changes, to pricing and marketing innovations (new products, more 
aggressive publicity), as well as to an increased number of mergers and acquisitions. 
Moreover, greater business instability makes it harder to distinguish the effects of 
management decisions on firm performance from the effects of other factors. Consequently, 
the value of actions that better align the incentives of managers and shareholders increases 
(better monitoring, incentive schemes in compensation, a more concentrated ownership 
structure
18). Since smaller boards result in less free-riding and promote more rapid decision-
making, board size  is likely to contract. They also claim that, to the extent that outside 
directors play an important monitoring role, it might be expected that outside representation 
on boards of directors increases after deregulation. However, they also observe some degree 
of path-dependence in the internal governance decisions of firms. Part of the inertia may be 
explained by defensive measures taken by managers. In Europe, the post-privatization control 
restrictions kept by governments are certainly a potential source of inertia in the corporate 
structures of deregulated firms. 
   
ii) Regulatory Policy and Other Issues in Public Policy 
  Regulatory decisions on industry structure determine the horizontal and vertical 
competition implications of different ownership forms. Regulated prices determine the free 
cash flow that managers will have access to, in order to finance diversification activities.  
The traditional view of the role of interest groups in regulation is based on the Capture 
Theory. According to it (Stigler, 1971), regulators are puppets under the influence of producer 
interests, much better organized and with higher stakes per capita than consumers. Peltzman 
(1976) supplemented this theory with the more complex argument that regulators face 
competing interests that may push policy into different directions. One can distinguish 
between upper level and lower level capture (Dnes and Seaton, 1999). The former would take 
place when interest groups lobby the government at the policy design level (Grossman and 
Helpman, 2001), and the latter when they lobby regulators at the policy implementation level 
(Laffont, 2000). The possibility of capture at different stages of the policy making process is 
an instance of the multi-principal nature of government. Checks and balances between 
different governmental institutions may reduce the leverage of interest groups (Spiller and 
Vogelsang, 1997). In addition to this, as Laffont and Tirole (2000) describe, the subsidiarity 
principle holds in the European Union telecommunications liberalization process: European 
authorities set principles and governments adapt them through more detailed policies. For 
example, the European Union set up a policy principle of interconnection according to which 
prices have to be based on direct costs, which goes against the interests of incumbents such as 
Telefonica.
19 The implementation of this principle, however, differs widely across countries. 
 
                                                 
18 Since deregulation increases monitoring costs, ownership structure becomes more concentrated to make it 
privately rational for individual shareholders to incur these costs. 
19 Sidak and Spulber (1997) analyze the specific problems that former regulated monopolists face when 
confronted to deregulation. They provide arguments supporting the existence of an implicit regulatory contract. 
If the existence of this contract is not recognized and its terms are not fulfilled, new investment will be more 
costly than it needed. In particular, according to these authors interconnection prices should be set as to allow the 
former monopolists to obtain a rate of return that covers its cost of capital. Although their analysis is centered on 
the US, the point they make on the risks of not compensating for former monopolists' past investments is of 
general relevance.  
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a) Fourth hypothesis: policies which voters are less informed about are more prone to 
be captured by lobbies than those about which voters have more information. Some 
theoretical reasons for the opposite of capture theory happening (i.e., incumbents being 
punished by regulators) can be found in Grossman and Helpman (2001): voters’ information 
may reduce the ability of organized interests to provide campaign contributions, because such 
contributions can do nothing to sway an informed electorate. Therefore it should be expected 
that policies which voters are less informed about (e.g. policies on corporate control, such as 
golden shares or takeovers restrictions) are more prone to be captured by lobbies than those 
which voters have more information about (e.g. pricing policies). The existence of several 
competing lobbies is also another reason for which one single lobby may fail to make its 
interests prevail. Hence liberalization, insofar as it implies the entry of new interest groups, 
should be associated with less clout for incumbents. In particular, one would expect that 
incumbents can do little to press for favorable access pricing policies, where the pressure of 
entrants in the opposite direction will be fierce. Another reason for capture not being observed 
in equilibrium is because constitutional measures may be taken to prevent it. But then these 
constitutional measures have a cost, e.g. in terms of less powerful incentive schemes to reduce 
rents (Laffont, 2000). Following this rationale, the levels of capture that are observed in 
reality are just the tip of the iceberg of a much larger set of transaction costs. 
b)  Fifth hypothesis:  Existence of firm’s agency problems and politics’ agency 
problems induces collusion between politicians and managers. Trillas (2000, chapter 3) 
shows that managers, due to the endogenous rents they capture with a dispersed ownership of 
the firm, may collude with politicians at the privatization stage, inducing a less concentrated 
than optimal ownership structure. Politicians may adopt a high dispersion policy (through 
privatization techniques, golden shares, takeover restrictions) to share with managers the rents 
from dispersion at the expense of shareholders, in the form of campaign contributions, 
politically orientated investments, etc.  Notice that such collusion is just a more detailed 
account, based on micro-foudations, of capture. This collusion gives substance to the usual 
claim that privatizations have both political and economic ends. 
   
Table 3 summarizes all the hypotheses. 
 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
  The study analyzes the statistical impact of new information release. The ''event study'' 
is a statistical approach
21 that researchers commonly use to measure the impact of a particular 
information release. The methodology is suitable to interpret the effect on shareholders of 
facts that have not been progressively anticipated by the market to a significant extent. There 
are some examples of event studies applied to regulatory events related to one single firm, 
such as Dnes and Seaton (1999). It is also illuminating to use the technique to analyze other 
events related to privatized and regulated companies, mainly the strategy of the company 
itself. In other words,  the purpose is to translate a technique that has been fruitfully used for 
other firms [e.g. Lys and Vincent (1995) and De Angelo et al. (1996)], to the analysis of a 
large privatized, regulated firm, combining the case study and the statistical analysis of 
information disclosure about events related to the firm's performance. Event studies, in its 
most widespread version, are a marriage of efficient market theory with an index model for 
predicting stock returns. It consists of first translating variables into rates of return, then 
netting out general market movements, and, finally, examining the relationship between 
                                                 
21 See Bhagat and Romano (2001) for a recent survey.   
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residual returns and events. The objective is to measure the unexpected return that results 
from an event. This is the difference between the actual stock return and the return that might 
have been expected given the performance of the market. This expected return can be 
calculated using an index model. 
According to this model, stock returns are determined by a market factor and a firm-
specific factor. The stock return,  t r , during a given period  t, would be expressed 
mathematically as 
  t mt t e br a r ? ? ?  
where  t m r  is the market's rate of return during the period and  t e  is the part of a security's 
return resulting from firm-specific events. The parameter  b  measures sensitivity to the 
market return, and a is the average rate of return the stock would have in a period with a zero 
market return. The firm’s specific return may be interpreted as the unexpected return that 
results from the event. 
  The parameters are usually obtained for a period before the events of interest 
(estimation window) and the difference between the predicted returns and the actual returns 
for the days of interest (event window) are called abnormal returns. From this, it is possible to 




   
i) Relevant facts related to Telefonica have been obtained from the web page of the Spanish 
Stock Exchange Commission (Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores) and in the Hydra 
and Lexis-Nexis Executive databases. A total of 56 events have been analyzed. The period 
under study coincides with Juan Villalonga’s period as Chairman of Telefonica, i.e., between 
June 1996 and July 2000. This provides a useful window to analyze the impact of changes in 
the company and in public policy as a result of privatization and deregulation. 
 
ii) All the information and articles about Telefonica in the world major newspapers, including 
English speaking and Spanish speaking ones, from the Lexis-Nexis Executive database in 
1996-2000 has been used to check the accuracy of dates and descriptions. 
   
iii) Stock prices have been obtained from Datastream, and they come from a return index that 
takes into account the reinvestment of dividends.
22 Details on the statistical treatment of data 
are presented in appendix 1. 
 
4. Facts and Impact on Shareholder Value 
Table 4 and Table 5 in the Appendix 2 summarize the results about the impact of 
different events on the stock returns of the company. Each event corresponds to an 
announcement that implies an update on the market information about decisions taken either 
by policy-makers or by managers. Events with overlapping dates were eliminated, unless they 
belonged to the same set of events.
23 Still, the impact on stock prices of the new information 
is relative to the expectations. Care must be exercised in the inferences derived from this 
                                                 
22 The same exercises were performed with a price series that did not take into account re-investment of 
dividends, without changes in the results. 
23 The events on June 7, 8 and 12 in 1996 overlap but belong to the same set of government’s policy. In Table 5, 
only the abnormal return for the cluster of dates between the day before these three events and the day after is 
reported.  
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evidence. Authors’ judgement and qualitative and factual knowledge are used in interpreting 
the results. 
Table 4 provides aggregate results about the reaction of shareholder wealth to four sets 
of events:  regulatory policies (decisions by the Spanish Telecommunications Agency), 
managerial decisions on acquisitions, managerial decisions on mergers and alliances, and 
managerial decisions on corporate governance. The table reports the number of days of each 
set of events, the cumulative abnormal returns for these days and the t-statistic. It must be 
stressed that these data do not provide a welfare analysis, but just evidence of the creation of 
shareholders' value. Furthermore, the methodology reflects market expectations, not the actual 
performance of the company after the events reported here. 
 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
i) The Firm 
Three sets of managerial decisions have been analyzed to explore the extent of the 
agency problems in Telefonica: 1) acquisitions (MA), 2) mergers
24 and alliances (MMA), and 
3) managerial decisions on corporate governance (MG). 
The aggregate effect of acquisitions is positive but not significantly different from 
zero. This is consistent with most of the empirical results of bidding firm returns in takeovers 
and acquisitions. Due to the free-rider effect amongst target firm shareholders, the bidding 
firm tends to offer an acquisition price that equals the ex-post value of the acquired firm with 
the new management, which eliminates any gain for bidding shareholders.
25 Notice that this 
may be consistent with an overall creation of shareholder value, where such value may be 
captured by the target shareholders. Notwithstanding this is what happens in most empirical 
studies, nothing can be said about it here, because target share returns have not been analyzed 
(in many cases, they cannot be analyzed, because some of the targets were not quoted in the 
stock market, as it is the case with many media firms). 
Telefonica had already started in the early 90’s a very ambitious investment activity in 
Latin America, with controlling stakes in Chile, Argentina and Peru's largest 
telecommunications operators. The managers appointed in 1996 maintained this policy. The 
effect of the individual acquisitions in Latin America was not statistically significant. The 
exception is the takeover in 2000 to acquire the remaining shares in most of the Latin 
American subsidiaries (events of January 13 and July 3, 2000, in table 5). Two explanations 
seem equally plausible to us to explain such a positive effect. First, taking full control of the 
subsidiaries implied a new organization for the company, creating a truly global management 
structure that could better respond to a global market. Second, the deal implied that small 
shareholders in the subsidiaries would now become shareholders of Telefonica itself. That 
meant that also the ownership structure of Telefonica was becoming global, and hence any 
attempt to control the company from the political process in Spain would now be more costly. 
Although investors may value the scope economies in a converging business such as 
media, some of the moves into this and other sectors were probably motivated by non-
economic reasons. There is probably a trade off between productive synergies and private 
benefits from control (which are potentially substantial in a high profile industry such as 
media,
26 where these benefits can additionally be shared collusively with politicians). 
                                                 
24 The distinction established here between acquisitions and mergers is that in acquisitions the target firm is 
significantly smaller than Telefonica. 
25 Regulation in the target firm’s product market also constrains the potential gains of bidding shareholders. See 
Trillas (2000). 
26 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
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The activities of the new management in the media sector triggered accusations of 
collusion with the ruling Popular Party in its aim to create a media holding competing with 
Prisa, a left-wing leaning media holding with important stakes in radio, TV and newspapers, 
and co-owner of the Digital TV platform Canal Satelite Digital. Investors reacted positively 
but not significantly to the creation of a Digital TV platform around Telefonica, and 
negatively but not significantly to investments in the radio sector. They also reacted 
ambiguously to the investment in Antena 3 TV. Concerning the investment in the group 
Recoletos/Pearson to create a multimedia group and undertake common business in the 
contents sector, investors reacted positively and significantly (event of September 24, 1997, in 
table 5).  The reaction to the acquisition of Endemol was negative but not statistically 
significant and the acquisition of Mediaways had a negative and significant effect on 
shareholder value (event of June 6, 2000, in table 5). 
Events in 1999 and early 2000 show the ambition of Telefonica to be an active player 
as a global operator in the New Economy. The flotation of Terra Networks, the Internet 
subsidiary, was a great success, becoming the largest European Internet firm by market 
capitalization. The spin-off took  place after Telefonica had been aggressively acquiring 
Internet firms in Spain and Latin America. Terra Networks value would subsequently decline, 
following the trend of the “new economy” in 2000 and 2001. 
The aggregate effect of corporate governance decisions is not statistically significant 
either, although it is positive. In spite of the fact that most of the announcements in this set 
reflected a process of management entrenchment, shareholders did not value it negatively. 
This may be consistent with two possible explanations: the shareholders anticipated that an 
"initiative effect" would be positive for managerial effort; or the shareholders anticipated that 
making takeovers more expensive for potential bidders would increase the gains for target 
shareholders of any actual takeover. 
The hard core of shareholders in place during the Socialist government period was 
kept in place after appointment of the new management and full privatization. However, the 
institutions in the hard core remained passive in all the changes that the company undertook 
during these years. The appointment of nine ''independent'' directors can also be interpreted as 
a move to a more controlled Board by the Chairman, Juan Villalonga, since he proposed the 
names of the new directors and at the time there were no objective legal criteria in Spain as to 
what an “independent” director was.  
The evidence about how consistent is Telefonica’s evolution with the predictions 
made by Kole and Lehn (1997) is mixed. A leaner hierarchy was achieved by eliminating the 
position of CEO. However, to make sure that it would be very costly to change the new 
structure, defensive measures were taken in 1998 to prevent takeovers, proxy fights or any 
form of losing control. According to these measures, 1) a candidate for the Board of Directors 
must have held more than 1000 shares of Telefonica for at least three years before 
nomination, unless 85% of the members of the Board agree to remove such a condition; 2) a 
candidate to become Chairman must have held a position in the Board of Directors for at least 
three years before nomination, also with the 85% rule; 3) independently of  her or  his 
holdings, no shareholder’s votes can account for more than 10% of the total votes.
27 As 
predicted by Kole and Lehn (1997), the Board of Directors became smaller than before. With 
this more nimble structure, Telefonica's management had a high degree of discretion to 
undertake ambitious expansion and diversification programs and more aggressive marketing 
campaigns. 
                                                 
27 Given these restrictions, Crespi and Garcia-Cestona (1999) argue that “given the existent dilution for this 
company, these measures create an added power for the managerial team. (…) Through these measures, the 
company is breaking the one-share-one vote rule, giving more discretionary power to managers and seriously 
affecting the governance of the firm.”  
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Concerning financial structure, the most significant change was the new dividend 
policy announced in 1998. Telefonica would not distribute dividends, in order to have more 
funds available for an aggressive investment policy. The investors’ reaction to  the new 
dividend policy was not statistically significant. Increasing cash-flow for investment was not 
deemed value-enhancing. 
Interestingly, the set of events on mergers and alliances had a positive and significant 
cumulative effect on shareholder value (MMA in table 4). The events included in this set have 
in common that they increased the probability of the control structure of the firm being 
significantly altered. The new managerial team shifted international alliances in 1997, leaving 
Unisource to reach an agreement with BT first and WorldCom and MCI next (over time, this 
alliance lost practical importance for the company). The alliance with BBVA (Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria, which was a result of the merger between Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and the 
privatized bank Argentaria) strengthened the role in Telefonica of one of the financial 
institutions in the hard core of shareholders. According to the press information checked to 
build up the event list, with this alliance BBVA and Telefonica would co-operate in a number 
of projects involving information and communications new technology.  
The events in this “mergers and alliances” set that had the largest impact on 
shareholder wealth were the announcement of an alliance with MCI-Worldcom and the 
announcement of a merger with KPN. These deals, had they gone ahead as originally planned 
and announced, would have transformed Telefonica to a truly global operator controlled by 
non-Spanish shareholders, which would have made it very difficult for the Spanish 
government to keep any sort of residual control on the company.  
The Spanish government eventually stopped the merger with KPN by threatening to 
use its golden share, on the grounds that KPN was a company controlled by the Dutch 
government. The Spanish authorities argued that the resulting entity would reverse the initial 
privatization in a paradoxical way. However, the announcement of the merger had a positive 
impact on shareholder value. Hence, the fact that the government stopped it is illustrative of a 
discrepancy between the control structure that maximizes shareholder value and the control 
structure that maximizes the objective function of the government. And it is also illustrative 
of the fact that retaining the golden share gives the government a strong influence on the firm 
even in the post-privatization. 
A few weeks after the merger with KPN collapsed, the Chairman of Telefonica, who 
had been appointed by the government when the company was not yet fully privatized, 
resigned under strong pressure from the government (see below). The collusive equilibrium 
between manager and politicians was collapsing and a new manager was needed to sustain 
it.
28  
In 2000, at the end of the period of interest, Telefonica was the main 
telecommunications operator in Latin America, being present in Argentina, Chile, Peru, 
Puerto Rico, Venezuela, El Salvador, Guatemala and Brazil. In the media sector, it 
participated in Antena3TV and Via Digital in television, in newspapers Expansion and Marca 
and in radio networks, Onda Cero, among others. 
To summarize the findings as they relate to the hypotheses in Table 3, there is 
evidence of political interference with the company’s control, which is consistent with the 
notion of privatization with political and economic ends, and with lingering political controls 
in privatized firms. There is partial evidence of the free cash flow theory, as some of the 
acquisitions had a significantly negative effect on shareholder value but others had a positive 
                                                 
28 One referee suggests an alternative explanation for Villalonga’s firing that the real reason could be that he was 
fired because he was a bad manager. However, the good performance of the company as reported in Table 2 
makes this unlikely. In any case, what the facts show is that there was political interference in a fully privately 
owned company. However, is difficult to be conclusive about the real motives of the government  interference.   
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effect, and the overall effect was not significantly different from zero. Still, it is clear that 
changes in the company’s control were welcomed by shareholders (although they were 
eventually stopped by government intervention), revealing that the existing control structure 
was not optimal. Some of the predictions of Kole and Lehn (1997) about a better alignment 
between managers and shareholders are confirmed, but the findings also confirm that this 
process of better alignment was not complete. 
     
ii) Regulation and Policy 
The first striking fact in the analysis of public policy is the diversity of institutions that 
have a potential impact on the value of the company. Contrary to simplistic views of "a firm" 
and "the regulator," it is apparent from the event selection that decision-makers that can 
influence the value of Telefonica include the Spanish government, the Spanish 
Telecommunications Agency, foreign governments in countries where the company has 
invested, the European Commission and other institutions of the European Union, the Courts, 
the Spanish Stock Exchange regulator and the Spanish anti-trust authority. Decisions or 
announcements by the Spanish government, the Spanish Telecommunications Agency, the 
European Commission and the Brazilian government are found to have a significant impact 
on the share value of the firm. 
There is no evidence of capture at the government level (upper level capture), in the 
traditional sense of the government being captured by the firm. It can be shown that the 
cumulative effect of the Spanish government's decisions on shareholder wealth is negative but 
not statistically significant.  
The cumulative effect on shareholder value of announcements made by the Spanish 
telecommunications regulator (lower level capture) is positive (see Table 4), which would be 
consistent with the new regulatory agency being captured by Telefonica. However, this 
aggregate result must be interpreted with caution, since it is driven by two particular events 
(events of November 30, 1999, and February 8, 2000, in table 5) with a strong positive effect, 
in both cases announcements that the Telecommunications Agency would start investigations, 
without yet revealing the results of these investigations. Announcements of decisions on other 
important policy issues, such as interconnection prices, appear to have a negative effect on 
shareholder value. 
Policy decisions by other institutions do not have an overall statistically significant 
effect. The aggregate effect of all policy announcements on shareholder wealth is not 
statistically significant, which is consistent with a checks and balances multi-principal view of 
public policy. The European integration process and the process of liberalization itself, by 
which different firms have a stake in lobbying the policy-makers in opposite directions (for 
example  in the contentious issue of interconnection prices), make it more difficult for a 
telecommunications incumbent to influence the general direction of the regulatory process.  
Two subtle effects must also be recognized. First, Telefonica's shareholders did not 
expect to lose from the liberalization process per se. The European Commission was the main 
advocate of such liberalization policy, and when it announced that it would press Spain to 
speed liberalization  up  in the Telecommunications sector, the reaction of the firm's 
shareholders was positive and statistically significant. This reflects the view of shareholders 
that Telefonica was in a good position to benefit from liberalization, due to incumbency 
advantages and the growth in demand that was expected at the time as a result of 
deregulation. Second, Telefonica faced regulatory risk not only in Spain, but also in other 
countries, and most notably in Latin America. Governments such as the Brazilian had been 
under growing pressure from voting consumers and rivals of Telefonica to reduce the 
advantages that were conferred upon privatization to incumbents controlled by Telefonica. 
This is reflected for example in the negative and significant abnormal return in Telefonica’s  
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share prices when a Brazilian minister announced fines to Telefonica for inadequate service 
on March 1999 (event of March 29, 1999, in table 5). 
  The size and importance of the company gives it a high lobby potential in front of the 
regulators and decision makers. The capture hypothesis would suggest that the public powers 
abide to the pressure of Telefonica, since consumers are too numerous and disorganized to 
counterbalance the producers' clout. However, the political economy of regulated sectors is 
more complex than that, as seen above in the subsection presenting the hypotheses. The bitter 
arguments that have taken place between Telefonica and the regulatory bodies can be related 
to the multi-level structure of government. The company's management may have captured 
policy-makers in some decisions and not in others. Overall, with more firms competing for 
policies after liberalization, it is very difficult that the company manages to capture the 
general direction of regulatory policies. Telefonica's executives colluded to some extent with 
the top echelons of the government, interested in promoting media interests and maintaining 
some residual control in the company. Colluding with policy-makers in policies related to the 
control of the company was easier than capturing regulatory policy. In policies related to 
corporate control (privatization, golden shares, influence in appointments) voters are not well 
informed and managers do not face the opposition of well-organized rivals. 
  Hence, in relation to the hypotheses presented in Table 3, our findings are consistent 
with Grossman and Helpman’s view that those policies which voters are informed about or 
where there are competing lobbies, are policies that will not be captured by one particular 
lobby. Privatization and corporate governance policies create rents for managers, and at the 
same time voters are less informed about them (than they are about, say, pricing policies). 
These rents may take the form of an inefficient use of the free cash flow. Politicians may 
want to share these rents to maximize their own interests, which may not coincide with those 
of uninformed voters. This reflects the interplay between agency problems in politics and 
agency problems in the firm, which is consistent with the predictions in Trillas (2000). 
 
iii) Managerial turnover and political objectives in privatized Telefonica 
The replacement of Villalonga
29 is a clear example of the presence of political 
constraints in the company’s control. Villalonga eventually resigned on 26 July 2000. His 
forced replacement is similar to a typical management change forced by a block-holder, 
although in this case the block-holder is de facto the government through the threat to use its 
golden share.  
Several aspects of the strategy of Telefonica were controversial from the point of view 
of public opinion and the political arena. Two of these aspects were the stock options plans 
and the entry into the media industry. The stock options granted to the top executives of the 
company attracted political and media attention and were criticized as an instance of 
inequality of opportunities in the new economy. The Spanish Socialist Party used them as an 
argument to pledge  in 2000  a windfall tax on the privatized firms similar to the one 
implemented by the Labour Party in the UK in 1997 (however, the Spanish Socialist Party 
lost the election). The entry of the company in the media industry also put Telefonica's 
management in the spotlight, since some commentators claimed that it reflected collusion 
                                                 
29 A few days before the Chairman’s resignation, the financial press argued that the campaign to remove Juan 
Villalonga, Telefonica's chairman, was unsettling investors and could harm the company. A coup by hard core 
members BBVA and La Caixa would signal that Telefonica had other masters to serve. As reported in the FT 
Lex Column in July 18, 2000: “Looking beyond personalities, the basic problem is that Telefonica has its roots 
as a Spanish company. Spain's government and national banks are unwilling to surrender their influence over 
what is increasingly a genuine multinational. But surrender they must if Spain's new breed of globally ambitious 
companies is to compete successfully on the world stage.”  
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with the political powers. De Angelo et al. (1996) show the important consequences that this 
''politics of finance'' may have in mobilizing constituencies that eventually may trigger 
political action against the company's shareholders.  
Villalonga had been appointed by the Spanish government when the state was still the 
largest shareholder in the company in 1996. For a long time, the Chairman had been 
understood to be the government’s man in the company, and the hard core of shareholders did 
nothing to undermine his powerful position. However, since late 1999, the high profile of 
Villalonga, the controversial stock options plan and his unrelenting deal-making, were 
starting to be politically costly for his political principals. The government first let it know its 
disagreement with the stock option plan of Villalonga and his team, which had caused heavy 
political upheaval in the run-up to the March 2000 general election.
30 Then, in May 2000 the 
government forced changes in the alliance with BBVA, which had also caused controversy in 
the run-up to the election, and which was seen by some as an attempt of Villalonga to protect 
his personal role in the company. Subsequently, the government blocked the merger with 
KPN on the grounds that this would place the Dutch government as the main shareholder of 
Telefonica. Finally, the government encouraged an inquiry by the Spanish stock exchange 
regulator to probe whether Villalonga could be charged with illegal insider trading for a minor 
stock options operation prior to the deal with WorldCom-MCI two years ago (the probe found 
no evidence of irregular dealing). There were rumors revealed by The Wall Street Journal that 
ministers were furious because officials of Telefonica were having conversations about some 
strategic deal with the (opposed to the government) media group PRISA. Villalonga was 
eventually replaced in a board meeting by Cesar Alierta, himself a member of the board of 
Telefonica and previously Chairman (also appointed by the government prior to privatization) 
of the tobacco firm Altadis (see FT, 27 July 2000). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a disperse 
ownership and give managers a high level of discretion in running the company. By this, the 
government  virtually created an agency problem inside the firm. There were no strong 
shareholders to constrain the managers, nor was the threat of a takeover was a credible one, 
since the government kept a golden share. There is no overall evidence of capture of 
politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although evidence 
suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. We interpret the 
political interference with the firm’s control [a well documented phenomenon both in this 
study and in the cross-country literature on privatization (see Megginson et al. 2002); e.g. 
influence in appointments, golden shares]  as the most visible part of such collusion. 
Liberalization and multi-level regulation will likely make any type of collusion or capture 
more difficult in the future. 
Collusion is possible due to the endogenous managerial rents that result from agency 
problems in the firm (and may take the form of an inefficient use of the free cash flow 
through wasteful but politically valuable acquisitions).  Managers can deviate from 
decisions that are optimal for shareholders. And politicians may deviate from the policies that 
are optimal for voters (since they can share the managerial rents, e.g. through politically 
valuable acquisitions). Due to these reasons, there may be interaction between managerial 
and political agency problems, i.e. between the inability of shareholders to fully control 
managers and the inability of voters to fully control politicians.  
Two sets of evidence reinforce the hypothesis that managers did collude with 
politicians. First, shareholders reacted positively to news of mergers and alliances that would 
                                                 
30 The proximity of the German general election in 2002 was also suggested to be a reason for the forced 
resignation of DT’s chief executive, Ron Sommer (see The Economist, 19/07/2002).  
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have significantly altered the control structure of the company, and the most important of 
these mergers, the one with KPN, was vetoed by the government. Second, the manager that 
was appointed by the government before the final privatization tranche, stayed in his position 
for three years after full privatization. The government was eventually able to force his 
resignation when there was disagreement between manager and government (something that 
can be interpreted as the result of the collapse in the collusive equilibrium), even though the 
ownership was fully private. 
The privatization of Telefonica took into account both political and economic ends, 
which is consistent with recent empirical research on privatization around the world. Political 
mechanisms of control were in place after privatization, in particular the golden share. Some 
deals that would have been positive for shareholders were not completed, and some of the 
deals that were completed had a negative effect on shareholder value. The operation of the 
different potential managerial disciplining devices in Telefonica was not optimal. No strategic 
private block holder exercised true authority in the company in the period under study. The 
government’s golden share made takeovers impossible and takeover threats ineffective. The 
Board of Directors was dominated by the management whose ultimate authority depended on 
the government, as was shown with the replacement of Villalonga by Alierta. However, the 
fact that Telefonica was  listed in several stock markets was a relevant constraint for the 
management’s behavior.  Liberalization will make any kind of capture or collusion more 
difficult in the future, due to the existence of a more competitive lobbying process. Multi-
level regulation has a similar effect, by making it more costly to firms to influence policy 
makers. 
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Appendix 1. Statistical treatment of data. 
Three-day returns (which is the most common event window for similar studies
31) are 
computed as: 
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3 AR  is the three day prediction error as an estimator of the abnormal returns and 
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where  ) ( t AR VAR  is the variance of the time series of daily abnormal returns. 
When aggregation for more days is performed, the formula for the t-statistic just changes in 
that instead of 3 the appropriate number of days is introduced. The estimation window for 
which the parameters of the index model have been computed goes between 31/12/94 and 
31/12/95. 
  The empirical counterpart of the market return used is the S&P 100 index, reflecting 
the fact that increasingly Telefonica has become a global operator and it is quoted in the New 
York stock exchange.
32 
                                                 
31 For a recent example, see Besanko et al. (2001). 
32 Using an index of European telecom stocks is not advisable since many European incumbent operators, as it is 
the case of Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, were not yet listed in the stock markets at the beginning of  
the period under study. Using the Spanish Ibex-35 would have raised a different problem: the analysis would 
have been distorted because of the heavy weight of Telefonica in this index, about 15 percent and even larger in 
some years.   
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Appendix 2: Table 5: Full List of Events 
 





June 7, 1996  The Spanish government appoints Juan Vilallonga as Chairman of Telefonica  PG     
June 8, 1996  The government announces plans for telecommunications policy: Retevision as second 
operator, creation of regulatory agency and conditions for Telefonica’s participation in 
cable 
PG     
June 12, 1996  The government announces that government deregulation may be slowed down  PG  0.0723  2.155 
October 25, 1996  The European Commission is pressing  Spain to speed liberalization of its 
telecommunications sector up 
PO  0.0441  1.86 
November 8, 1996  The government announces a 10-year golden share on Telefonica  PG  0.0076  0.321 
November 29, 1996  Telefonica arrives to an agreement with other corporations, both public and private, to 
develop a new digital TV platform 
MA  0.0022  0.094 
December 9, 1996  The government announces preparations for the public offer of its remaining stake in 
Telefonica 
PG  0.0273  1.154 
December 18, 1996  Telefonica obtains a 35% stake in Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicaçoes (CRT) 
of Brazil 
MA  0.0048  0.203 
January 15, 1997  Telefonica announces that coinciding with total privatization it will reduce to 18 the 
number of Directors and introduce corporate governance reforms “including 
recommendations from the most prestigious reports” 
MG  0.0063  0.267 
January 29, 1997  The board appoints nine “independent” Directors by co-optation  MG  -0.0115  -0.485 
March 15, 1997  Officials indicated the day before that the interconnection fee could be between Pta 2 and 
Pta 2.5, considerably less than Pta 6.5  – Pta 9 Telefonica hoped to earn from rival 
companies 
PG  -0.0496  -2.094 
March 24, 1997  The Spanish government is up to fix a low telephone interconnection fee in order to allow 
Retevision, its planned second telecoms operator, to aggressively compete in the domestic 
market against the national operator, Telefonica 
PG  0.0222  0.936 
April 18, 1997  Telefonica announces a strategic alliance with BT and reconsiders its participation in the 
European Alliance Unisource 
MMA  0.0374  1.578 
May 2, 1997  The Spanish government has resolved a dispute with the European Commission by 
agreeing to take measures to put Airtel Movil, its second mobile telephone operator, on an 
equal footing with Telefonica, the incumbent operator 
PO  0.0045  0.189 
June 19, 1997  A negotiated settlement to compensate Airtel, Spain’s second mobile phone operator, has 
finished one of the Spanish government’s longest deregulatory battles with the European 
Commission 
PO  0.0327  1.379 
June 27, 1997  The European Union rules that the Spanish government’s decisions on Digital TV violate 
the Treaty of Rome 
PO  -0.0255  -1.077 
July 24, 1997  Telefonica informs that it is negotiating the acquisition of participation in Antena 3  MA  -0.0255  -1.078 
July 29, 1997  Telefonica acquires 25% Antena 3 TV  MA  0.0197  0.831 
August 8, 1997  Telefonica announces that it will take control of Antena 3 TV and through it of 40% in the 
company that has the rights of the pay-per-view-football-games 
MA  0.0134  0563 
August 15, 1997  The European Commission has warned Telefonica against pressing ahead with 
controversial television plans until they become fair on competition grounds 
PO  -0.0132  -0.557 
September 24, 1997  Telefonica reaches a strategic agreement with the Recoletos/Pearson Group. Telefonica 
will acquire 20% Recoletos Compañía Editorial 
MA  0.0582  2.456 
March 9, 1998  Telefonica reaches a strategic agreement with WorldCom/MCI  MMA  0.051  2.151 
March 16, 1998  In a meeting with institutional investors, the company announces a growth strategy 
focused on increasing share value, instead of distributing dividends. It also announces that 
it may float TISA in the stock market and that the hard core will stay in place 
MA  -0.0077  -0.325 
June 19, 1998  A consortium participated by  Telefonica acquires the Brazilian company CRT in 
exchange of US$ 1,018 million 
MA  -0.0288  -1.214 
June 24, 1998  An extraordinary shareholders meeting approves defensive measures against takeovers 
and proxy fights 
MG  0.0426  1.797 
July 23, 1998  Telefonica wins the contest for 51% voting shares of Compañía Intel from El Slavador  MA  -0.0254  -1.073 
July 30, 1998  In an auction that took place in the stock exchange market of Rio de Janeiro, a consortium 
leaded by Telefonica obtains the operating companies Telesp, Telerj and Tele Sudeste 
MA  -0.0125  -0.528  
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Celular 
September 8, 1998  Telefonica buys 100 hundred radio stations in Spain  MA  -0.0142  -0.599 
October 29, 1998  CMT gave green light to the latest interconnection tariff proposal, which is 20 per cent 
cheaper than previous proposals and between 30 and 50 per cent cheaper than the original 
offer by Telefonica 
PR  -0.0155  -0.654 
November 15, 1998  CMT criticizes Telefonica’s resistance to liberalization  PR  -0.0145  -0.611 
November 26, 1998  The CMT has fixed a three-month period (up to end-February 1999) to reach a consensus 
among agents (operators, manufacturers, associations of users) and Telefonica, about the 
best formula to make it possible to maintain telephone numbers 
PR  0.0212  0.895 
February 3, 1999  The Spanish restrictive practices court has fined Telfonica Pta 580 million for abuse of 
dominant position, setting “predatory” prices and discriminating against a competitor, 
British Telecom (BT) 
PO  -0.006  -0.254 
February 12, 1999  Renato Guerreiro, the chairman of the Brazilian National Telecommunications Agency 
(Anatel), said the day before that the telephone operators Telerj, Telefonica (former 
Telesp), Telpe, Teleamapa, Teleacre, Telepara and CRT will be fined a total of up to R$ 
51.6 million for delaying the installation of 271,000 previously paid fixed lines 
PO  0.0254  1.072 
March 29, 1999  Brazil’s justice minister says the will impose a maximum R$ 2.9 m (US$ 1.8m) fine on 
each of the privatized telephone companies serving Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro for 
providing inadequate services 
PO  -0.0438  -1.849 
April 17, 1999  The Spanish government tried slow inflation down by announcing a sweeping package of 
measures including price cuts in electricity, gas and long-distance telephone calls 
PG  -0.0188  -0.794 
May 22, 1999  The Spanish telecommunications sector watchdog (CMT) has decided in favor of 
Telefonica with regard to the complaint against its alleged abuse of dominant position. 
The regulator will allow Telefonica to go on selling basic telephony services, satellite 
television, through Via Digital, and internet access, via TeleLine, saying that it does not 
infringe the moratorium imposed to Telefonica for supplying cable services 
PR  0.0101  0.426 
July 7, 1999  Anatel, the government’s telecommunications regulator in Brazil, has said it may impose 
R$ 40m (US$ 22.6m) fines to the three regional companies and one long-distance carrier 
that currently handle the bulk of country’s telecoms 
PO  -0.0099  -0.416 
September 20, 1999  The Spanish government is up to award four licenses in the next few weeks to operate the 
new Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) mobile phone technology 
PG  0.0154  0.651 
November 30, 1999  The Spanish telecommunications market commission (CMT) has noticed that Internet 
users who are customers of operators other than Telefonica SA have problems when 
trying to take advantage of discount vouchers marketed by Telefonica for Internet 
connection. Jose Maria Vazquez, chairman of CMT, announced the day before that the 
matter would be investigated 
PR  0.0571  2.41 
December 14, 1999  A Madrid court ruled the day before that Teleline, the Telefonica’s internet service 
provider, must cancel two clauses in the contract that it makes clients sign, and must make 
changes in two other ones 
PO  -0.0155  -0.654 
January 13, 2000  Telefonica announces a takeover bid for 100% on four of its Latin-American subsidiaries  MA  0.0605  2.554 
February 8, 2000  The Spanish telecommunications market commission (CMT) is investigating several 
companies in the sector in order to  determine whether they are guilty of lacking 
transparency and obstructing competition by means of launching offers restricted either to 
their customers or to groups of business and domestic customers. CMT is acting in 
response to complaints that several operators (Retevision, Telefonica, Euskaltel and 
Agrupacion de Operadores de Cable) have made against each other concerning the offers 
made to chambers of commerce and other groups of customers 
PR  0.0593  2.501 
February 11, 2000  Strategic agreement with BBVA bank  MMA  0.0339  1.43 
March 11, 2000  Announcement of conditions in UTMS contest  PG  0.008  0.339 
March 18, 2000  Telefonica announces the day before a Euro 5.5 bn (Pounds 3.36 bn) agreed bid for 
Netherlands-centered Endemol Entertainment, Europe’s leading independent TV 
production company 
MA  -0.0224  -0.944 
April 25, 2000  The Spanish government said the day before that it was launching an inquiry into possible 
antitrust measures against Telefonica and BBVA bank group over an internet alliance 
agreed in February 
PG  -0.0017  -0.071 
May 2, 2000  Telefonica has been thought to be negotiating a tie-up with Dutch telecoms group KPN  MMA  0.1078  4.548 
May 8, 2000  Royal KPN NV and Telefonica SA said they called off merger talk after plans to create 
Europe’s fourth-largest phone company failed to receive sufficient support from the 
PG  -0.0699  -2.95  
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Spanish company’s board 
May 16, 2000  Spain’s Terra Networks SA plans to buy one of America’s biggest internet ventures, 
Lycos Inc. An official and one of the companies confirmed rumors that the Spanish 
company was going to acquire Lycos 
MA  -0.0355  -1.498 
June 1, 2000  Board’s meeting of Telefonica, done the previous day, the first since its failed merger with 
the Dutch operator KPN, focused on the acquisition of the US portal Lycos by Terra. The 
operation was approved by unanimity of all members 
MA  0.0199  0.841 
June 6, 2000  Telefonica reached the previous day an agreement with German publishing group 
Bertelsmann to acquire its Mediaways internet services subsidiary 
MA  -0.0494  -2.083 
June 10, 2000  KPN, the Dutch telephone company, is still considering a merger with Spanish rival 
Telefonica. KPN’s attitude change coincided with the solution to one of the major points 
of disagreement that hindered talks last month. The previous day, KPN reached an 
agreement with the Dutch government about a quicker sale of the entire 43.25 per cent 
government’s stake in KPN 
MMA  -0.0009  0.024 
June 18, 2000  Six weeks after Telfonica and KPN acknowledged merger talks had failed, they are at it 
again, but this time are trying to receive support from the suspicious governments which 
blocked previous attempt 
MMA  -0.0693  -2.922 
June 24, 2000  The Spanish government introduced the previous day a number of measures in order to 
liberalize the economy. Companies affected by the measures, such as energy companies, 
oil producers and telecommunications operators, saw their share prices rise following the 
announcement 
PG  0.0193  0.816 
July 3, 2000  Telfonica said the previous day that it had completed a 14 bn (US$ 13.4 bn) equity 
financed buy-out of three Latin-American affiliates and expected to gain outright 
ownership of a fourth one this week 
MA  0.1174  4.954 
July 26, 2000  Vilallonga resigns as Chairman of Telefonica  PG  -0.0022  -0.093 
 
 
List of event types: PG (Governmental Policy); PR (Policy by the Spanish Regulator); PO (Policy by Other Institutions); MA (Managerial 
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Table 1. Privatization of Telefonica and Public Offerings 
Date  Revenues (
6 10 Euros)  % capital sold  % state-stake after PO 
June 1987  283.7  6  32 
October 1995  1,000.2  11  21 
February 1997  3,885.5  21  0 
Source: Bel (2002) 
 
Table 2. Stock Prices of Selected European Incumbent Operators 
  April 1996  February 2000  July 2000  % Change 
(Apr. 96/Jul. 00) 
Telefonica  14.89  80.09  58.49  293% 
British Telecom  40.54  172.42  128.77  218% 
Deutsche Telekom  19.04*  78.99  41.21  116% 
France Telecom  34.15**  153.44  121.24  255% 
Telecom Italia  27.87  169.25  124.10  345% 
Stock prices are in US $ as quoted in the New York Stock Exchange, adjusted for dividends and stock splits. The 
stock prices of the same company in different markets (say, New York and Madrid) should be the same due to 
the existence of arbitrage opportunities if the prices were different. 
*DT started trading in November 1996. 
**FT started trading in October 1997. 
 
Table 3. Hypotheses 
Area  Hypothesis  References 
 Privatization has political and economic 
ends. There will be political interference 
with the company’s control. 
 Jones, Megginson, Nash and 
Netter (1999) and Bel (2003) 
Effects of Privatization 
After privatization managers will undertake 
expanding projects beyond those that are net 
present value 
Jensen (1986) 
Effects of Deregulation  Deregulation induces a better alignment 
between managers and shareholders 
interests 
Kole and Lehn (1997) 
Policy and Regulation  Policies about which voters are less 
informed are more prone to be captured by 
lobbies than those about which voters have 
more information 
Grossman and Helpman 
(2001) 
Firm’s Agency Problems + 
Politics’ Agency Problems 




Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) by Event Type 
  MA  MMA  MG  PR 
N  51  18  9  18 
CAR  0.07479  0.15988  0.037448  0.117745 
t-stat  0.765  2.75
* * *   0.91  2.03
* *  
List of Event Types: MA (Managerial Actions on Acquisitions), MMA (Managerial Actions on Mergers and 
Alliances), MG (Managerial Actions on Corporate Governance), PR (Policy by the Spanish Regulator),. 
* * *
 : significant at 1% level. 
* *
 : significant at 5% level. 
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 Figure 1 Comparison between Telefonica, S&P 500 and other telecom incumbents 
TEF: Telefonica 
FTE: France Telecom 
DT: Deutsche Telekom 
BTY: British Telecom 
SPX: Standard & Poor 500 
 
 